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THE RIGHT TO DIE
GREEN LIGHTS AND YELLOW
LIGHTS IN CRUZAN RULING
:

Yale Kamisar

n the long-awaited and much-discussed Nancy Cruzan case, a 5-4
Supreme Court majority ruled
/ that absent "clear and convincing
evidence" that a once but no longer competent patient wishes to discontinue
her life support (in this instance artificial nutrition and hydration) a state is
not constitutionally compelled to terminate that support.
Nancy's situation is tragic. Since
suffering severe injuries in 1983, she
has been in a persistent vegetative
state. Yet medical experts testified that
if her feeding tube were not removed
she could linger on in her present condic
tion for many years.
But the first thing to keep in mind
about the Cruzan decision is that the
question presented was not whether
pulling the feeding tube under the circumstances is desirable or sensible,
but whether it is constitutionally mandated. The Cruzan case went all the
way to the U.S. Supreme Court because Missouri, the state where the liti-
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gation arose, applies a heightened standard of proof of a patient's wishes before life support could be terminated.
The Court did not "approve" or "endorse" the Missouri standard; it simply
found nothing in the Constitution that
prevents a state from utilizing such a
standard.
On the facts of the Cruzan case,
many states would reach (or already
have reached) a different result. Nothing in the Cruzan decision affects the
law in these other states. Nothing
takes away a broader "right to die" in
these other jurisdictions. A state remains free to apply a lower or looser
standard of proof of the patient's
VQ_Shes or even-absent any specific evidence of what the patient would
want-simply to defer to the decision
of close family members.
Although the opinion of Chief Justice William Rehnquist was officially
designated as the "opinion of the
Court," Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
cast the decisive vote and wrote a sepa-

r

rate opinion that merits the closest attention. This brings us to the second
point to remember about the Cruzan
case: Because the four dissenting justices take an even more expansive
view of the constitutionally protected
"right to die" than she does, Justice
O'Connor's separate opinion is really
the opinion of the Court.
The chief justice "assumed for purposes of this case" that a competent person does have a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration
and nutrition. Justice O'Connor was
more explicit and more emphatic on
this point. Forcing a competent adult
to "endure [artificial feeding] against
her will," she wrote, ''burdens the patient's liberty, dignity, and freedom to
determine the course of her own treatment. Accordingly, the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause must
protect, if it protects anything, an individual's deeply personal decision to reject medical treatment, including the artificial delivery of food and water."
Proponents of the "right to die"
achieved a significant victory when the
Court rejected a distinction between
the feeding tube and other forms of life
support. In the 1970s such a distinction was widely regarded as an important one. But our way of thinking
about this matter changed dramatically in the 1980s. The American Medical
Association, various other medical/legal groups, and a number of state
courts rejected any such distinction.
On the eve of the Cruzan case, how-

ever, the issue was still a matter of considerable dispute. A number of commentators maintained that the distinction
should be preserved for various reasons: Nutrition and hydration are basic
care, not medical treatment; denial of
such care poses a serious threat to the
doctor-patient relationship, and permitting withdrawal of artificial nutrition
and hydration undermines the psychological distinction between "killing"
and ''letting die." Moreover; nearly half
of the forty states that have adopted living will statutes (including Missouri) explicitly exclude artificial nutrition and
hydration from the category of life-sustaining treatment that may be refused.
Nonetheless, five justices (O'Connor and the four dissenters) seem to
have put an end to this controversy,
obliterating the distinction as a matter
of constitutional law. This feature of
the Cruzan case strikes me as more remarkable than the Court's conclusion,
on the particular facts of the case, that
a state is not constitutionally compelled to discontinue life support.
Does an incompetent patient have
a constitutionally protected "right to
die" under certain circumstances? Before lapsing into her present condition,
Nancy had neither made a "living will"
nor designated anyone else to make
health-care decisions for her. What if
she had?
The chief justice left open the question whether a state might be required
to defer to the decisions of a surrogate
selected by the patient herself while
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still of sound mind. Once again, Justice
O'Connor put it more strongly. In her
view, the duty of a state to implement
the decisions of such a surrogate "may
well be constitutionally required to protect the patient's liberty interest in refusing medical treatment."
That Justice O'Connor refused on
the proxy decision-maker procedure
rather than on the living will is interesting. A number of commentators have
maintained that because the former procedure is more flexible than the latter
and not restricted to cases of "terminal
illness" it is superior to the living will.
In general, living will statutes require that the patient be "dying" or "terminally ill" before the directive can become operative. As these terms are commonly defined, a patient must be suffering from an irreversible condition that
will produce death in a short time regardless of medical intervention. If
these definitions apply, Nancy was neither "dying'' nor "terminally ill." (Nor,
for that matter, was Karen Ann
Quinlan.)
But none of the justices suggested
that even if there were "clear and convincing'' evidence of Nancy's wishes to
remove the feeding tube, her wishes
could be frustrated because her condition had stabilized-if artificial nutrition and hydration were not stopped
she could live for another twenty or thirty years. Indeed, at one point Justice
O'Connor observed that "a seriously ill
or dying patient whose wishes are not
honored may feel a captive of the machi-
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nery for life-sustaining measures."
I venture to say that in some future case the Court will leave no doubt
that one's "right to die" cannot be denied solely on the ground that she is neither "dying'' nor "terminally ill." Nor
will the "right to die" be denied solely
on the ground that the life support involved is a feeding tube rather than a
respirator.
As I have already indicated, I
think the Cruzan decision is a narrow
one. The particular result the Court
reached will turn out to be less important than some of the general observations Justice O'Connor made about a
constitutionally protected "right to
die."
Under our system of constitutional
law, when the states regulate in a
field-especially in a still evolving area
of law, morality, and social judgment
about which reasonable people differthey do not have to wait for a "green
light" from five Supreme Court justices. They are free to act unless and until the Court flashes a "red light." On
the particular facts of the Cruzan case,
the Court declined to flash such a
light-but it did not display a green
one either. Instead, five justices flashed a yellow light. They issued a warning that in this area the states must proceed with caution-looking constantly
through their rear view and side view
mirrors at the U.S. Constitution.■
Yale Kamisar is professor of law at the University of Michigan.

